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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis is preparing a 
Handbook of S y s t m s  Analysis, which will appear in three volumes: 
a Vdume 1: Overuinr, is aimed at a widely varied audience of producers and 
users of systems analysis 
a Vdume 2: Methods is aimed at systems analysts who need basic knowledge of 
methods in which they are not expert; the volume contains introductory over- 
views of such methods 
a Vdume 3: Cases contains descriptions of actual systems analyses that illustrate 
the methods and diversity of systems analysis 
Volume 1 will have ten chapters: 
1. The context, nature, and use of systems analysis 
2 Applied systems ar~alysis. a genetic approach 
9. Examples of systems analysis 
t The method of applied systems analysis: finding a solution 
5. Formulating problems for systems analysis 
April 27, 1980 
8. Generating alternatives for systems analysis 
7. Ertimaing and predicting consequences 
8 Guidance for deiision 
9. Implementation 
10. Principles of good practice 
To  these ten chapters will be added a glossary of systems analysis terms and a bibliogra- 
phy of basic books in the field. 
Drafts of this material are being widely circulated for comments and sugges- 
tions for improvement. In addition to responding to such interventions, the task of de- 
tailed cmrdination d the chapters-prepared separately by several authors-has yet to be 
carried out Correspondence about this material should be addressed to the undersigned. 
This Workvlg Paper is the current draft of Chapter 8. 
A word about the format of this Working Paper. In order to make the text 
of each chapter easily amended, it has been entered into the U S A  computer, from 
which the current version can be reproduced in a few minute's time whenever needed. 
This Working Paper was produced from the version current on the date shown on each 
Page. 
Hugh J. Miser 
Survey Project 
April 27, 1980 
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GUIDANCE F O R  DECISION 
B. Schwarz, K. C. Bowen, lstvan Kiss, and Edward S. Quade 
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N  
Previous chapters have presented a summary description of the classical 
methodology of systems analysis and then treated in more detail problem formulation, the 
identification, design, and improvement of alternatives, and, finally, model building and 
the use of models to predict the consequences that follow each choice of alternative. T h i s  
chapter is concerned with the guidance an analyst can provide, based on the information 
he has produced regarding the advantages and disadvantaps of the various alterna- 
tives, to those responsible for selecting an action. This selection cay sometimes be un- 
complicated, but more often, when there are competing objectives, multiple decisionmak- 
ers, or greslt uncertainty abuut future cunditiuns, it tecon-res a cumplex social process in 
which conflicts are resolved by bargaining and political judgment overpowers research 
findings Objectives and constraints may be changed and new questions posed, forcing 
filrther analysis. 
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An analyst can never, based on his analysis alone, say with confidence: This 
alternative should be selected.' His mathematical model may designate an optimum ac- 
tion but this action is an optimum only in the domain of the model, for even the most 
perfect of models corresponds only imperfectly to the real world. Optimization is a 
technical concept, inapplicable in situations where differing values, uncertainty, ambigui- 
ty, multidimensionality, and qualitative judgment are present and possibly dominant. 
Even with perfect information, the most that can be done is to find the alternative that 
best satisfies a certain criterion under a given set of assumptions. This  is far from full 
optimization; this would require the simultaneous consideration of the complete set of 
cansequences for every choice of alternative, taking into account the full range of fiture 
events and their assaiated probabilities For multiple decisionmakers, there can, in fact. 
be no optimality; any such concept depends on a particular decisionmaker's values, pur- 
pare, ability, and need. Consequently, as Boothroyd (1978) puts it '...would-be-scientific 
intervention is at best a way of getting things right- not of getting them right.' Earlier, 
for ather causes, Charles Hitch (1960) had laid the ghost of optimization to rest in his 
retiring address as president of ORSA: '...Most of our relations are so unpredictable that 
we do well to get the right sign and order of magnitude of first differentials. In most of 
our attempted optimizations we are kidding our customers or o u r ~ l v e s  or both. If we 
can show our customer how to make a better decision than he would otherwise have 
made, we are doing well, m d  all that can reasonably be expected of us." 
Thus, in systems analysis, whenever the terms optimum, optimal, and opiimi- 
ziition are found, they niust be interpreted with great caution, for they refer to sunrething 
that is, at best, a suboptimization. 
In systems analysis as presented in Chapter 4, the decisionmaker was assumed 
to be a goal-oriented individual who m a k ~ s  his decision rationally by taking intn cm- 
sideratim the probable consequences of each of his available courses of action, selecting 
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the best by balancing the extent to which these actions achieve his objective against 
their costs. This  model (called the 'rational actor model" or Model I in Allison, 1971) 
suffices to produce good results for many operational and some policy or strategic deci- 
sions. It is not, however, an adequate formulation for decisionmaking in the public sector 
or for policy and strategy formulation where large complex systems are concerned. 
These latter decisions cannot be separated from the managerial, organizational andlor 
political situation in which they are made (Mintzberg and Shakun, 19'18) and the classi- 
cal model must be supplemented or modified by bringing in organizational and political 
considerations (Allison 1971, Lynn 1978, Rein and White 1977). Nevertheless, F o r  
solving problems. a Model I-style analysis provides the best first cut. Indeed, for 
analyzing alternatives and distinguishing the preferred proposal, there is no clear alter- 
native to this basic framework" (~ l l i son  19'11, p. 268). As remarked earlier, the degree 
to which systems analysis can define good policy depends to a large extent on two key 
elements-agreement regarding objectives and the strength of the underlying scientific 
understanding of the problem (Nelson 1977). About the latter, we can say nothing in this 
Handbmk. But, before reviewing various schemes for presenting the results of analysis 
in ways to better facilitate decision by the responsible authorities, we can say somewhat 
more than has been said previously about objectives and the related concepts of con- 
straints and values. 
2. OBJECTIVES, CONSTRAINTS,  AND VALUES 
Ideally, problems with objectives and constraints are settled early in the 
study. 111 prxlice. however, systems ar~alysis is a1 iterative process a i d  objectives 
change and constraints are introduced or removed as we, and our sponsors, learn from 
the study. Also, as time for a decinon nears, the decinonmaker who sponsored the study 
is strongly influenced by interpsted parties and other decisionmakers whose domain may 
be affected by whatever action should be taken. 
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T o  help a decisionmaker, it is, of course, crucial to know what he wants to 
achieve. H e  may have more than one objective. If so, then these objectives compete in 
the sense that, for given resources, if he is to strive for more of one, he rr~ust usually ex- 
pect less of another. 
Ideally for the analyst, there are clear, well thought through, and preckely 
spelled out objectives when the study is commissioned. Ln complex problems, however, 
this is hardly ever the case. Objectives must be fixed with a fair degree of certainty 
early in the problem-formulation phase of a study, for they determine what alternative 
actions are to be considered. When the consequences of these alternatives have been 
worked out, it is important in the light of the information gained to reexamine the origi- 
nal objectives and perhaps introduce modifications and design new alternatives 
Even when objectives are well defined by the client at the outset, they can 
seldom be adopted uncritically by the analyst. Means are sometimes taken for ends; a 
decisionmaker may say that his problem is where to place a new comprehensive health 
center in his district, but his real objective may be to improve health services in his 
community. In that case, better ways to do  the latter may be to provide several neigh- 
borhood health centers or services through other mechanisms (hospital outpatient clinics 
or grnup practice). Perhaps programs focusing on matprnal and child health services, or 
the screening of apparently well people to turn up heart conditions, should be considered. 
Unless the broader objective is adopted, these latter alternatives will not appear. 
For certain issues, the question of whose objectives are relevan: may need to 
be considered. For public issues, it is some subset of the citizens of today or of futui-e 
generations, the decisionmaker is merely the person or organization charged with the 
responsib~lity for changing the system and the analyst may have to find some discrete 
way to make this clear. 
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It is important to distinguish between objectives on different levels. A 
lower-level objective is a means to achieve a higher-level objective. T o  build a new 
health ceriter car1 thus be considered a lower-level objective arid to improve health srr- 
vices a higher-level objective. Clear definitions of lower-level objectives are usually 
more easily provided and are technically easier to use for ranking decision alternatives. 
However, misleading results will occur if the lower-level objectives are not, under all 
circumstances, an appropriate means to achieve the higher-leve! objectives. T h e  rela- 
tionship need not be direct; for example, to relocate fue  stations, the objective of lower- 
ing average travel time serves well as a substitute for better protection of lives and pro- 
perty (Walker et al. 1979). 
High-level objectives usually express general intentions and are valid over a 
longer time period. A frequent problem is that such objectives are difficult to formulate 
clearly enough for direct use in analytical studies. 
Constraints often have a function similar to objectives from an evaluation 
point of view. Herbert Simon (1964, p. 20) writes 'It is doubtful whether decisions are 
generally directed towards a goal. It is easier and clearer to view decisions as being con- 
cerned with discovering courses of action that satisfy a whole set of constraints. Tt is this 
set, and not any one of its members, that is most accurately viewed as the goal of the ac- 
tion. If we select any of the constraints for special attention, it is (a) because of its rela- 
tion to the motivations of the decisionmaker, or (b) because of its relation to the search 
process that is generating or designing particular courses of action. Those constraints 
that rnutivae the decisionmaker mid those that guide his search for actions are some- 
times regarded as  more 'goal-like' than those that limit the actions he may consider, or 
those that are used to test whether a potential course of action he has designed is satis- 
factory. Whether we treat all the constraints symmetrically or refer to some asymmetri- 
cally, as goals, is largely a matter of linguistic or analytic convenience.' 
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When a distinction between objectives and constraints is made, it is usually 
based on the idea of a constraint as an absolute restriction. G. Majone (1978) suggests, 
and we cmcur, that when there are several objectives they can always be traded uff at 
the margin if this leads to an improvement in the total utility. That  is, it is reasonable to 
sacrifice a particular objective if the situation on the whole is thereby improved. A cm- 
straint on the a h e r  hand, cannot be so exchanged against other constraints, for its logical 
force resides wholly in its inviolability. However, the translations of a decisionmaker's 
desires into a problem formulation, including the definitions of limit values (constraints), 
must be done with a lot of care. For example, once a constraint, a limit value, is esta- 
blished by, or in concurrence with, the decisionmaker, it will be held to during analysis. 
Majone (1978) remarks: T h e  opportunity cost of a proposed policy constraint must be 
carefully considered before the cotlstraint becomes firmly embedded in the analytic 
structure. A s  Hitch and McKean (1960, p. 196) write, 'casually selected or arbitrary 
constraints can easily increase system cost or degrade system performance manifold, and 
lead to solutions that would be  unacceptable to the person who a t  the constraints in the 
first place.' They cite the example of a weapon-systems study, where a constraint on ac- 
ceptable casualities lead to solutions in which 100 million dollars was being spent, at the 
margin, to save a single life. Many more lives could have been saved with the same 
resources Had  the policymakers realized the opportunity cost of their safety require- 
ments, they w u l d  probably have set them at a lower level. O r ,  !ike good utilitarians, 
they may have chosen to treat the risk factor as a subgoal, to be optimized compatibly 
with other system's requirements arid the available resources." 
A number of different approaches can be used to expedite the process of 
reducing the number of obiectives when there are multiple objective: (and constraints). 
The  following list gives m e  examples. All of these requi r~  d isc~~aion  among thrse de- 
cisionmakers holding competing objectives and a certain amount of com prom i~ and con- 
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cession. 
Objectives which are only means to achieve other objectives can be elim- 
inated. 
If all the objectives can be interpreted as  means to achieve some higher- 
level objective and a relevant measure of effectiveness or good proxy that corresponds to 
this objective can be defmed and measured, than this higher-level objective may serve 
as the single objective 
A preference ordering of objectives can sometimes be set up and "optirniz- 
ingw done in sequence. 
All objectives except (the most important) one can be converted into con- 
straints, by agreement on the minimum acceptable level of attainment. 
Tradeoffs among the objectives can be sought and used to construct a com- 
posite index of worth, a value or utility function (decision analysis). 
No effort can be made to "optimize' with respect to any specific objective. 
Instead, all objectives can be converted into constraints and with the agreement that any 
solution satisfying all constraints-called a satisficing solution-will be "pod enough.' 
It is, of course, not always possible to reach the agreement necessary to imple- 
ment any of the above, although the use of special techniques to increase the value sensi- 
tivity of decisionmak~rs (Dror 1975, p.250) may make them more amenable to 
compromise. W e  will treat value sensitivity in a section under that title after dixussing 
satisficing and the more common schemes for prese~ting results: cost-effectiveness and 
cat-benefit analysis, decision znalysis, and the so-called "scorecards." 
First, however, it should be mentioned that quw~titidivc evaluation schemes 
often cannot be based directly on estimates of the extent to which various objectives are 
achieved. T h e  problem is that many objectives are difficult or impossible to quantify 
directly in any useful fashion. It  is therefclre necesary tn use a surrogate nr prnxy, a 
substitute scale that can measure at least approximately the extent to which the real ob- 
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jectlve is attained. T h e  problem is to get a good approximation. Thus  to measure the 
quality of medical care in a community, one might use the infant mortality rate as a 
proxy. 
One  technique for finding quantifiable measures of effectiveness is to try 
several successive modifications of tentatively postulated passibilities for stating an objec- 
tive to see whether any appropriate measures of effectiveness appear. Sometimes it can 
be easier to try several measures of effectiveness. These can be examined to see wheth- 
er, if they were satisfied, the desired end would be achieved. 
T h e  mark of a good measure of effectiveness is that it closely reflects the ob- 
jective. Unfortunately, there are a number of inadequate ways to go about obtaining 
such a measure. 
O n e  is to use input to measure output; to compare the quality of primary 
school education in various districts in terms of expenditures per pupil. A second is to 
use workload measures or efficiency measures to compare quality of output, say, to com- 
pare the quality of education on the basis of teacher-pupil ratios. 
Consider a single unambiguous objective, say, to improve garbage collection. 
T o  facilitate comparisons, it is useful to have a scale on which to measure the effective- 
ness of the various possibilities But there is no obvious scale to measure better garbage 
collection. sn we need a proxy-a measure such as the percentage of blocks remaining 
without health hazards, or the reduction in the number of fires involving uncollected 
solid waste, or rodent bites, or valid citizen complaints. All of these unfortunately treat 
just an aspect, not the full value cjf better garbage collection. In practice, people often use 
even less satisfactory scales, for instarice, art input mcasurc-expenditure per househirld- 
or an efficiency measure-number of tons collected per man-hour-or a workload 
measure-tons of waste collected-that indicate nothing about the quahty of the work. 
When several attributes need to be considered, some system of weighting is 
sometimes used, resulting in an ordind or cardinal utility function. T h e  failing here is 
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that the function is to a large extent the product of the analyst's judgment and not that 
of the responsible decisionmakers T h e  decisionmakers, if they were willing to spend the 
time, cwld  work out their own set of weights (with guidance from the analyst) but even 
here the analyst's influence is powerful. H. Hatry (1970) comments 
There is no doubt that the job of decisionmaker would be easier if a single effective- 
ness measure could approximately be used. However, I contend that such procedures 
place the analyst in the position of making a considerable number of value judgments 
that rightfully should be made in the political decisionmaking process, and not by the 
analyst. Such value judgments are buried in the procedures used by the analysts and 
are seldom revealed to, or understood by, the decisionmakers. 
Such hocus pocus in the long run tends to discredit analysis and distract 
significantly from what should be its principal role: to present to decisionmakers al- 
ternative ways of achieving objectives, and to estimate and display all the major 
tradeoffs of cost and effectiveness that exist among these alternatives. 
3. SATISFICING 
Since optimization is impossible, satisficing is an attempt to move closer to the 
world as it actually is. T h e  reasons as summarized by H. Simon (1969, p. 64) are: "Tn 
the real world we usually dn not have a choice between satisfactory and optimal mlutions, 
for we only rarely have a method of finding the optimum. .,We cannot, within practica- 
ble computational limits, generate all the admissible alternatives and compare their rela- 
tive merits Nor can we recognize the best aliernative, even if we are fortunate enough 
to generate it early, until we have s e n  Ai of them. We satisfice by lookirig fur alterna- 
tives in such a way that we can generally find an acceptable one after only moderate 
search ." 
To satisfie, lower b u n d s  are set for the various goals that, if attained, arp 
"good enough." An alternztive is sought that will at least exceed those bounds. A unique 
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solution is nat sought and conflicts between goals do not have to be resolved. T h e  sa- 
tisficer does have to worry that the performance standards are not set too high, for then 
it may be impossible to satisfy the constraints. An alternative is usually considered to be 
good enough if it prorr~ises to do better than has been done previously. 
4. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND T H E  COST-BENEFIT C R m E R I O N  
Decisionmaking is often described as  a weighing of benefits against costs if 
the benefits and costs are interpreted in the broad sense of referring to dl kinds of ad- 
vantages and disadvantages of different decision alternatives. Sometimes risk is con- 
sidered as a cost, sometimes as a separate dimension. Comparisons of various alterna- 
tives in terms of benefit-cost-risk can therefore be considered a general framework of 
analysis (Dror 19'15). Nevertheless, when the term cost-benefit analysis is used, it usually 
refers to a somewhat simplified type of analysis, wen known to economists, and having its 
origin in welfare economics. 
In economic cost-benefit analysis the analyst identifies the different types of 
consequences of each alternative, usually a governmental project (e-g., the location of an 
airport or a power nation). The  consequences are estimated quantitatively and the quan- 
tities converted to monetary units. Monetary benefits and costs are then summed 
separately with proper attention to probability and time of occurrence. T h e  cost-benefit 
critnion means a ranking of the alternatives in decreasing order of the excess of benefits 
over costs. It should be borne in mind that not all costs and benefits, even though ex- 
pressed in the same monetary units, can necessarily be added in a strzightforward way, 
without additional scaling: costs like benefits have to be treated initidly as a multidi- 
mensional v ariabk. 
Cost-benefi? malysis has several attractive characteristics. The cost -benefit 
criterion seems very relevant for decisionmaking and defines a unequivocal method for 
ranking alternatives. Also, theoretically, it can be used to guide choice between such 
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diverse alternatives as allocating funds for a water project (with irrigation, electric 
power, flood control, and recreation as goals) or for a health program to reduce infant 
mortality. If the projects are roughly of the same scale, one prefers the project with the 
greater excess of benefits over costr, if the projected benefits are less than the casts, then 
the project should not be undertaken. 
Idealy, in an application, all consequences associated with implementation of 
an alternative, for all future time, should be identified, and then probability of their oc- 
currence and their benefit or cost to society determined. T h e  expected loss or gain to so- 
ciety is calculated by multiplying the amount by the probability of occurrences A 
discount rate is then assumed and the time streams of costs and benefits are discounted 
and summed to obtain their present values T h e  translation of consequences of imple- 
mentation into monetary terms includes estimates by the analyst of the prices that would 
have been attached to various goods and services if a perfectly competitive market had 
existed. In principle, cast-benefit analysis can thus associate with each possible choice all 
the inputs and outputs, all the positive and negative effects, including spillovers, with 
their probabilities and times of occurrence, condensing everything into a single number. 
However, a number of complications often arise in connection with practical applications. 
In practice, the quantification of all types of effects and their translation into 
monetary terms may be very difficult and any method u d  will be open to question. For 
instance, pollution effects can often not be considered as quite equivalent to some sum of 
money. Different decisionmakers may a190 have different time preference: and these 
may not be very convenieiltly expressed through the discount rate. Further, a general 
w n - ~ p t i u n  behind the cut-benefit approach is that undesirable distributional effects ciati 
be corrected by transfer payments costs and benefits, however, often accrue to different 
categories of people and sat~sfactory compensation to those who lose can often not be 
foi~nd. 
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As a consequence of the complications mentioned above there are various ob- 
jections to the use of a cost-benefit criterion. One is that it is easily subject to abuse 
since so many crltical assumptions tend to be buried in the computation. The  choice of a 
discount rate is particularly tricky. For instance, to promote a project with high installa- 
tion casts but with the benefits deferred in time, advocates would argue for a low 
discount rate (two percent has been used for some water projects where the benefits were 
marginal and a long time in the future). Perhaps the most common objection to the 
cast-benefit criterion is that it requires the analyst to make judgments (for instance in 
cmnection with distributional effects) which in fact are value judgments of the sort that 
should be lefc to the responsible decisionmaking body. 
Again, in theory, a considerable advantage of the cost-benefit criterion is that 
it permits comparisons of very different projects But experience of applications indi- 
cates that it is more likely to be used successfully when the decision alternatives are rath- 
er similar, i.e., with consequences similar in type and involving the same scale of effort. 
To give an illustration of the possibilities and limitations of cost-benefit 
analysis, we will here use a hypothetical application. Assume that an additional airport is 
considered to be required in a city area because of increasing air traffic. As the existing 
one cannot be extended, the problem is to fmd a suitable location for a second airport. 
To simplify, we will assume further that there are several suitable and uninhabited land 
areas and that air traffic does not cause any negative side-effects, i.e., there are no noise 
or air pollution problems. T o  calculate the costs and benefits of the different locations 
the analyst will have to estimate the impact on future air and surface travel, the rrlone- 
tary worth of savings in travel time, etc. These estimates may involve considerable un- 
certainties but rough approximations are Nely to be obtainable. Because of the uncer- 
tainties it may not he possible to arrive at a definite ranking n r d ~ r .  Neverth~lcss, very 
bad alternatives can probably be revealed as such and the analysis can help the decisim- 
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makers to focus their further attention on a subset of the original alternatives, a subset 
which is likely to contain only reasonably good alternatives. 
T o  make our hypothesized airport example somewhat more realistic, let us 
now assume that the alternative airport locatiorrs will, to a varying extent, bring noise 
disturbances into residential areas and also require that some residents, factories, etc. be 
displaced. This means that there will be a group of people who probably cannot be com- 
pensated in a way they find quite satisfactory. Surely this information is important to the 
decisionmakers and should be brought to their attention; the cost-benefit criterion alone, 
in this case, is not the most suitable basis for ranking the alternatives and needs to be 
supplemented in some way, say by a 'scorecard" presentation as described later. 
The term 'cost-benefit analysid is also used to describe studies whose results 
are not quite as condensed as a strict at-benefit criterion requires In such cost-benefit 
analysis, it is usually recommended that benefits and costs that cannot be expressed in 
monetary units in a satisfactory way be displayed separately. When there are such ef- 
fects more complex information has thus to be communicated from the analyst to the de- 
cisionmakers For the analyst to choose when and how to do this, the information ex- 
change between the analyst and the decisionmakers is of considerable importance. The 
analyst needs information about the decisionmaking situation and about what the de- 
cisionmakers consider important and he has to structure the communication of his results 
in s way to fit the prevailing decision situation and in the language of the decisionmalter. 
In the evaluation of risky projects with highly adverse but rare consequences 
and neglwble costs, a risk-benefit rather than a cost-benefit analysis is frequently used 
Ucnnergren aid Keerrey i979, Fischhuff 1977). Thr  fursdan~ental idea is t apprise  
whether or not the benefits outweigh the risks. It is used, for example, in deciding 
whether various food additives and drugs should be barred from the public. 
April 27, 1980 
Chapter 8 
5. COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
If we now turn back to our simplified airport example, it may happen that 
the study is kirrg carried out at a time when the decision to build a second airport has 
already been taken. Pe~haps several feasible and quite attracthe alternative locations 
have been found and general estimates or judgments have indicated that the benefits of 
a second airport will exceed the costs. In this case it may be an unnecessary complication 
to try to estimate the benefits in monetary terms for some measure of effectiveness (e.g, 
some kind of air-travel capacity measure) may be of more interest. More generally, a 
project is usually undertaken to achieve some objective; the measure of effectiveness 
should indicate the extent to which the objective is achieved. This leads us to a type of 
criterion of choice which can be termed cast-effectiveness. In this, alternatives are 
ranked either in terms of decreasing effectiveness for equal cost or i n  terms of increasing 
cost for equal effectiveness Sometimes the maximum of the ratio of effectiveness to cost 
is used to indicate the preferred choice but this is open to all the objections that apply to 
the use of ratios for criteria (Hitch and McKean 1960) and will require additional infor- 
mation to fix the nale of the effort, as seen by the tangent in Fig. 1. Here, typical cost- 
effectiveness behavior is illustrated for two progtarns. Whether I is preferred to 2 
depends on the scale of the effort; if, for instance, the effectiveness must be at least E2. 
then 2 must be preferred (Attaway, 1968). If, however, the cost cannot exceed C1, 1 is 
preferred. 
Cast-effectiveness is probably the most commonly used criterion for the 
ranking of alternatives. The reason is clear; it provides a comparison in terms of two 
factors of crucial importance to every decisionmaker-how much he will need to spend, 
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F i r  1. T ~ i c a l  cos t -ef fec t iveness  cu-rves. 
Cost 
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and to what extent the action he takes will get him what he wants. It may be a suffi- 
cient basis for choice only in those rare instances when "other considerations" are not sig- 
nificant, but the information it provides is always helpful. 
T h e  cost-effectiveness criterion is open to a number of objections One is 
that cost as used in cost-effectiveness reflects only the costs that are inputs-the money, 
resources, time, and manpower required to implement and maintain an alternative. T h e  
penalties or losses that may accompany an implemented alternative-it may, for instance, 
interfere with something else that is wanted or bring undesirable consequences to other 
people-are costs that are not taken into account. 
Ordinarily, effectiveness does not measure value but is merely a proxy for 
some aspect of i t  A different choice of how we measure effectiveness can lead to a dif- 
ferent preference among alternatives. For example, if the objective is to increase traffic 
safety and we choase as our measure of effectiveness the decrease in fatalities, we may 
then give high priority to reducing accidents where two cars collide at high speed, for 
these are very serious But if our measure is the decrease in the economic cost of ac- 
cidents, then priority may go to the avoidance of low-speed collisions in rush-hour traffic, 
for these are very numerous 
Another defect is that the people who must pay the casts of a dpcision and 
those who stand to gain may not be the same. Unless the dternatives are so similar that 
this aspect can be neglected, a decision based on a cost-effectiveness criterion may mear, 
trouble for the decisionmaker. Again, there is a likely clash of values. 
Finally, even if cost and effectiverress were fully and properly Jetertnir~ed, the 
decisionmaker would still be faced with the problem of what to choose. He needs some 
way to set the scale of effort-either the cost he must not exceed or the effectiveness level 
he needs to achieve. Sclmetimes this can bp provided by setting the maximum cost so 
that it corresponds to the 'knee" of the cost-effectiveness curve (Fig. l), since very little 
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additional effectiveness is p n e d  by h r the r  investment. 
It is clear that the type of con-effectiveness cri:erion we have d i n u d  here 
is often inadequate for decisionmaking problems for which multiple objectives, spillover 
effects, or the distributional aspects are important characteristics 
6. DECISION ANALYSIS 
Cost-benefit analysis, as presented above, can be considered as a means of 
reconciling competing objectives through converting the various consequences into mone- 
tary units. T h e  analysis is merely done for a higher-level objective-to find the course 
of action that brings the greatest excess of benefits over costs. As  the benefits and costs 
associated with any proposal are quantified in monetary units, a system of weighting the 
various consequences of courses of action is, in effect, being used. 
Numerous other schemes for using a weighted combination of the conse- 
quences to provide a preference ranking of the alternatives have been tried. Some of 
these work satisfactorily when the decisions involved are of a repetitive type. Under the 
name of decision analysis a considerable body of knowledge has been developed which, 
in principle, is applicable both for the one-time decision as well as for the repetitive deci- 
sion. 
In the decision analysis approach, the analyst attempts to mcdel the value sys- 
tem or preference structure of the decisionmakers in such a way as to be able to predict 
with the model what the decisions would be, were the decisionmakers to be presented 
with the full set of alternatives and their consequences. T o  do this, an attempt is made 
to construct a functiwrr of the form 
representing the decisionmaker's value or utility rating of each alt~rnative. Horp !he 
x.'s, i = 1,2,..,n, are measures (on appropriate scales) of the consequences, properties, as- 1 
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pects or anything else associated with an alternative that the decisionmaker would take 
Lnto account in estimating the value of the alternative.' Thuq if competing designs for 
canmunication satellites were being ranked, x l  might be the initial investment cost, x2 
the expected mean time to fdure,  xg the number of channels, and so 011. The total 
number of factors that the decisionmaker considers is n. 
Any aggregate approach of this type, like the cost-benefit approach, has two 
serious disadvantages. One is that a great deal of informafion is lost by aggregation; the 
fact that alternative A has environmental problems whereas alternative B has political 
implementation problems is suppressed. The second is that any single measure of value 
depends on the relative weights assigned by the analyst and the assumptions he used to 
get them into commensurable units 
T o  produce anything resembling a valid value function is clearly difficult and 
may be impossible in many situations. There are problems both with getting the prefer- 
ence information from the decisionmakers and with putting it together in a usable ex- 
pression2 The fra can require a substantial efTort on the p m  of the decisionmakers. 
Many analysts believe that, while such value functions are clearly useful for 
preliminary screening of alternatives, the final designation of a preferred alternative 
must be made by other means Particularly when the decision concerns the public sector, 
and the preferences depend on basic values, the decision thus being essentially a political 
decision, more disaggregated information needs to be communicated to the decisionmak- 
ers. Nevertheless, the analyst may, in the process of developing and using value func- 
tions, for his own initial inquiry, find that his understanding of the c~mpleity of the prob- 
lem, and consequently the advice that he findiy offers, has been enhanced. 
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7. SCORECARDS 
If someone is to help me decide whether something I think I would like to 
have is worth what I would have to give up to get it, the most informative way for him 
to do so is to present me with a full and honest description of what I would be getting, 
and getting into, including all negative aspects and side effects. I would judge this 
preferable to being told that, because of previous decisions or statements, if I am to be 
consistent, I should do so and so. Many decisionmakers, ranging from individuals to the 
body politic, have this same feeling. 
The usual way of presenting the required information is by means of a matrix 
called a scorecmd (Goeller 1972). O n  a scorecard, the consequences that ensue from a 
possible decision to select each of the alternatives-the costs, benefits, spillovers, risks, 
segments of society affected, and in fact, anything about an alternative that the analyst 
thinks the decisionmaker might want to consider in his decision, including its charac- 
teristics and origins if that seems pertinent-are displayed (in terms of the natural units 
commonly used to characterize them) in a matrix, or tabular array. In such an array, 
the entries in each column represent the consequences associated with a particular alter- 
native and the entries in a row show how a particular consequence or other characteristic 
varies from alternative to alternative. [For examples, see the chapter on cost in Volume 
2 and Goeller 19'77.1 Improvement by Goeller over the usual presentation lies in the 
careful selection of units for characterizing impacts, in grouping similar impacts into 
categories, and in  the use of underlining, shading, or colors to show a n u d e  ranking of 
alternatives ( b a e d  on the analyst's irrteryrvtatiori of the decisionmaker's values of 
course). The aim is to provide the decisionmaker with an effective "gestalt" of the rela- 
tive advantages and disadvantages of particular alternatives. 
Consider noise impacts as an example. These have usually been reported in 
terms of land area exposed to a noise level above some specified threshold. But the de- 
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cisionmaker is more interested in how noise affect. people and in how many people. A 
scorecard can report the number of people expored to various noise levels on a noise- 
annoyance scale. 
T o  illustrate the detail with which impacts can be presentd, consider the 
group of 'community impacts' reported in a transportation study (Goeller 1972). These 
report changes in the activity patterns, tax base. and environment that would occur to 
the various communities in the repon as the result of conseruction and operation of vari- 
ous alternative transportation systems. Specific examples include the number of house- 
holds annoyed by excessive noise, the amount of air pollution. the savings in petroleum 
consumption, the households displaced by system construction, the amount of land taken, 
the resulting tax losses to the community, and even such an intangible as the loss of a 
community landmark. 
For oral presentation, color, in  the form of transparent colored rectangles 
placed over the numerical values, can be used to give a quick indication of each 
alternative's ranking on a particular impact. Goeller used green to show the best value 
and red to show the worst, with two colors for intermediate values, blue for next best 
and orange for the next to worst The  numerical values themselves were visible through 
the colors. Sensitivities to changes in parameters or to different forecasts for the en- 
vironment were shown by further transparent overlays and the use of multi-colored rec- 
tangles. 
The scorecard seems to be such a simple and obvious device that no up- 
ment for its use is needed. It is extremely flexible. A decisionmaker can see where an 
alternative he favors is deficient; he can ask what modifications would eliminate the un- 
favorable impacts from an otherwise promising alternative and whether that action 
might turn some presently acceptabe impact into an unacceptable one. He can call for 
further analysis to show how changes in the assumptions originally made by thrt analyst 
will affect the results. Since the decisionmaker assigns his own weights to the different 
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impacts, the sorecard can help him understand the tradeoffs implied by the declnon 
he is to make. If he chooses A over B he may be trading off substantial increases in 
noise and f'uture costs for savings in air pollution and initial investment costs. Such 
tradeoffs are implicit in every decision, but the decisionmaker who views an aggregate 
index may not see them for they have been obscured by the process that combined the 
different impacts into a single measure, even though he may have played a part in 
agreeing to that process. T h e  scorecard explicitly confronts the decisionmaker with the 
tradeoffs he must make. T o  decide, he must weight them subjectively, bringing to bear 
not only factual knowledge but his feeling for societal values 
A scorecard presentation can also be understood, and used, by the public. 
Different groups can, in the same way as the ultimate decisionmakers, ask "what i f  
questions, apply their own weights, and confront the decisionmakers with their views 
based on much more information than if they had merely an index to go on. 
T h e  advantages of the scorecard over an aggregated index for providing 
guidance to decisionrnakers may be summarized as follows 
T h e  scorecard 
seeks convergence to a decision-not agreement on value judgments from 
the decisionmaker or decisionmakerq 
is understandable and usable by decisionmakers and other groups involved, 
including the public at large; 
enables impacts and alternatives to be evaluated with m i n i m d  interposition 
of the analysts' biases and values; 
gives attention to qualitative as well as quar~titative impacts; 
retains multidimensionality, showing tradeoffs explicitly; 
uses catural physical and thus understandable units. 
A disadvantage, if there is one, is that it may present too much information 
for a decisionmaker to absorb. But this can be handled by careful selection of what to 
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present, holding other information for later presentation when requested, bearing in 
mind that this process must be kept as free from the analyst's values as possible.s 
8. V A L U E  ANALYSIS A N D  POLITICAL FEASIBILITY 
Values and beliefs held by individuals and organizations affect analysis at all 
stages from problem formulation to decision and implementat~on. Differences in values 
can lead decisionmakers to advocate different actions on the basis of the same study, 
and, after a choice is made, can lead the implementing bureaucracy to take actions the 
decisionmaker did not intend. 
In ranking the alternatives in preparation for a decision, or in helping the de- 
cisionmaker in ranking the alternatives, the analyst needs to discover a great deal about 
the decisionmaker's values. This  is not easily done; 'we can always ask people about 
their values, but in the end, we can only infer what values they appear to hold by 
analyzing their behavior, including their statements, in a number of situation " (Bowen 
1979). Other  approaches are possible. Bowen (1979) suggests such topics as the follow- 
ing merit more attention than they have been given: analysis of options, hypergame 
theory, structural mapping, personal construct theory, fuzzy sets, and a number of ideas 
stemming from conflict research and research gaming. 
It is sometimes argued that decision problems that are 'pnlitica!' nr value 
sensitive cannot be scbjected to analysis. According to another view, vdues and facts 
are distinguishable and analysts (or experts, scientists, etc.) should ccntribute only facts to 
the decisionmaking process. There are also arguments for a direct involvement of 
analysts in "value arialysis' which ir~cludes improving the value judgment of Tegithn ate 
value judges" without usurping that function. T o  quote Dror (1975): '...chis is achieved 
through methodolqpes deslg-ned to structure the judgment field and to explicate value 
dimensions in a way that permits more conscious, comprehensive and explicit j udgm~nt  
by the legitimate value judges. These processes help them to make more 'responsible' 
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value judgments on the basis of clarification of the hllest meaning3 of the involved 
values. Primary methods of value analysis include testing of value sensitivity, exarnina- 
tlon of value consistency, checking the completeness of the value set, explication of tacit 
value dime~~sions (eg., time preferences and lottery preferences), value mapping, con- 
sideration of value futures, design of value and goal taxonomies, and more.' 
The feasibility of implementation is an important aspect when decision alter- 
natives are compared. Depending on the decisionmaking process some alternatives may 
not be implementable if there are certain groups who object to them. The analysis of 
such aspects is sometimes called 'political feasibility" testing (Dror 1968). It involves in- 
vestigating the probability that a proposed action will be acceptable to various secondary 
decisionmakers-the special interest groups, the public, and the bureaucracy who must 
translate it into action. If the probability is too low, compromises can be made to increase 
acceptability. Analysis can help find the preferable compromises-those that increase ac- 
ceptability without a proportionate loss in attainment of policy goals. 
Cost-benefit and similar analyses, designed to produce an economically em- 
cient solution, may encounter political opposition. For an alternative to be politically 
feasible, it may not only have to approximate the largest total benefit available to the af- 
fected parties as a whole, but, in addition, allocate the aggregate benefits and coss 
among the various interest groups in a way that reflects their political strengths. Thus, 
the alternative selected must be acceptable to the most in fluencial interest groups and not 
too strongly opposed by the others. When a group is asked to accept an alternative in a 
situation where a competing alternative would bring them greater benefit, then, if the 
losses can be estinsated, the c h m n  alternaive frequently can be made acceptable (and 
thus politically feasible). by arranging a payoff to the objecting group, say, by tax ex- 
emptions or deductions desiped to benefit them specifically (Olson 1971, Starhng 1979). 
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9. UNCERTAINTIES 
In previous sections we have mentioned the existence of uncertainties but not 
sufficiently emphasized their dominant role, arid their pervasiveness in SySkmS analysis 
and decisionmaking. T o  evaluate decision alternarives we must estimate the future 
consequences of various courses of action, and the future is always uncertain. T h e  effects 
of some uncertainties, say those in economic, technical, and operational parameters that 
can be identified, measured, or at least estimated, and treated statistically, can often be 
taken account of in the analysis proper by actual calculation of the probabilities, or by 
Monte Carlo methods, or, less precisely, by using means or expected values. Sensitivity 
testing and a fortiori analysis can also be done and presented to the decisionmaker. 
Other uncertainties, about future environments and contingencies and about certain ac- 
tivities that depend on the actions of people (now as well as in the future), are more in- 
tractable. 
The decisionmaker is always confronted with a certain amount of uncertainty 
when presented with the results of a systems analysis. When the issue has long-term im- 
plications or involves a rapidly changing situation or one being manipulated by other de- 
cisionmakers, a number of different forecasts of the state of the world or scenarios may 
have to be considered. In this case, the results of the analysis as carried out for each 
contingency or forecase may not indicate the same order of preference among the alter- 
natives. What then can the analyst suggest to the decisionmaker if, under one contingen- 
cy with high probability of occurrence, alternative X is clearly superior, but, under 
another contingvncy of low probability but with catastrophic implications, alternaive B is 
better? 
Faced with such uncertainty the decisionmaker can, depending on the cir- 
cumstances, take one or more of the following actions 
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1) Delay: that is, defer his action until better information is available. Delay, 
of course, is not always an option and, when it is, V may be costly, particularly when com- 
petition or conflict is involved. 
!Z) Buy information: attempt to alleviate uncertainty by supporting further 
research and data collection. This  also involves delay and cost and may or may not im- 
prove the situation. 
9) Hedge: adopt duplicate alternatives or modify an alternative to introduce 
greater flexibility-at a higher cost, of course. 
4) Compromise: select an alternative that while it may not be best for the 
contingency judged to be most likely, does not rank too low on the less likely ones. 
5) B e  conservative: attempt to choose the alternative that gives the best 
result if the environment is maximally unkind. This  is the "maximin" approach, in 
which one resolves uncertainties by making the blanket assumption that the worst will 
happen. 
6) Use decision theory: argue that the probabilities of the various states of 
nature are not completely unknown and beyond human judgment, subjectively assign 
probabilities to them, and then use an approach that would be appropriate for the case in 
which the probabilities are known. 
T h e  U S .  military (which may have had as long an experience with systems 
analysis under conditions of uncertainty as any other institution) has something like the 
following philosophy. Any attempt to determine a unique best solution to a problem in- 
volving a large rsumber of uncertain factors, some of which may be under the influerice 
of other decisionmakers is doomed to failure. T h e  aim instead should be to search out 
or design alternatives that perform well or even close to the best for what appear to be 
the most likely set of contingencies and from such alternatives, whenever it can be done, 
select the one that gives some sort of reasonably satisfactory performance under the more 
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unlikely and even pessimistic circumstances 
10. RISK EVALUATION 
Side effects, or negative impacts that are not direct costs to be borne by the 
decisionmaker,' may sometimes need special attention both when designing and when 
comparing the alternanves Side effects are sometimes treated by imposing constraints. 
However, the elimination, or the reduction in the probability, of the occurrence of serious 
negative side effects must often be made an objective. Reductions that are below some 
low probability limit usually have a value. 
The term risk is often used in connection with uncertain negative side- 
effects5 More specifically, risk is often associated with highly negative consequences, oc- 
curring rarely. The exact meaning of risk varies somewhat Sometimes it means the 
probability of a negative consequence. In other cases it may mean the negative conse- 
quences themselves. In yet other cases, it may refer to the statistical expectation of the 
negative consequences. Most commonly, however, risk refers to the entire spectrum of 
negative consequences with their associated probabilities (see Jennergren and Keeney 
1979). 
Risk assessment is often thought of as consisting of two parts. risk estimation 
and risk evaluation. In risk estimation, one is concerned with identifying the various 
serious negative consequences of a project or activity, and assigning probabilities (or rates 
of occurrence) to those consequences In risk evaluation, one appraises the acceptability of 
the risk to society. 
A risk evaluation sometimes includes cmparisons with other risks that exist 
in society. This does not mean that such comparisons necessarily lead to definite conch- 
sions. T h e  acceptability of a risk depends a7 whether it is considered as a voluntary or 
an involuntary one, and also on the magnitude of the associated benefits. Alm, the char- 
acter of the risk is of importance. When two projects have risks with the same expected 
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value (and the same benefits) people are not necessarily indifferent to them. If the 
worst that can happen is less serious in project A than in project B many people will 
prefer A.  Consequently, risk evaluation may depend on value preferences, in which case 
the analyst must leave the find evaluation to "the legitimate value judges." 
11. DECISION PROCESSES. PLANNING, A N D  POLICIES 
h the previous parts of this chapter, we have assumed that the guidance to 
be given to the decisionmakers cmcerns the choice between a number of alternatives that 
have been evaluated in the analysis. Actually, the decisionmakers may make other types 
of decision. If the alternatives studied have been different designs of a public project, 
the first decision to be taken may not be a final decision in favor of one of the alterna- 
tives but may, for instance, be a decision: 
to study some of the designs in more detail, perhaps with new constraints; 
to accept a part of a design and keep the option open to choose later on 
between several alternatives 
to include one design, perhaps vaguely described, in a plan which is to be 
reconsidered or reviewed later on. Certain options are thus left open regarding the final 
version of the project; 
tn do further study. 
T h e  decision processes which follow a systems analysis may take many dif- 
ferent forms and the form to be chosen may be difficult to predict. However, s m e  in- 
formation about the likely decisionmaking process is usually available to the analyst(s) 
a r~d this type of irrfurmaion can be important to take into account both h the design and 
the evaluation phases of a study. Much research has also been devoted to decision 
processes (Alhson 1971, Simon 1957, Keen 1577, Cyert and March 1963, Lindblom 
1959). Results from wch descriptive-explanamry research is, of cot-~rse, of considerable 
importance to the applied systems analyst. 
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It should be stressed that a systems study dws  not always focus on the choice 
between a number of alternatives Sometimes the start of the study is a vagiely defined 
problem area and the output of the study consists of some tentatively defined ddecisiiu~ al- 
ternatives or some guidelines for developing such alternatives. In the US., many systems 
studies In the form of "program evaluations" have been performed. Here the study 
narts after the decision to launch a new program has been taken and the program has 
been tried for some time. The problem defined at the outset may be 'Has it worked as 
expected?' The result of the study is usually that it has not, but, more importantly, the 
study may suggest where to look for possible improvements (Hatry 1979). Analysis 
should not stop with implementation. Models are imperfect and circumstances change. 
As  part of the analytic effort, it should be determined as soon as possible whether the 
results are as anticipated, and if not, how to modify the process accordingly discovered. 
This monitoring and evaluating function could, and perhaps should, be undertaken by 
someone other than the original analyst or policymaker (Walker 1978). 
12. GUIDANCE FOR DECISION 
The effectiveness of these various schemes for presenting the results of 
analysis, and for carrying out the analysis itself, depnds  to an extent on the decision- 
making situation. It is best when the situation approximates the rational actor model. 
Other models-the process-oriented view (Simon 1949), the organization-process view 
(Cyert and March 1963, Allison, 1971), the political paradigm (Lindblom 1959, Allison 
1971), and the aypreher~sive man (Keen 1977)-are useful, not so much ui finding a 
"best' solution. but in finding one that can be accepted or adopted and implemented by 
the relevant organizat~ms. Adoptlon of a proposal is, in fact, usually easler than imple- 
mentation. At the decision stage, participants do not feel it necessary to resolve uncer- 
tainties, for they can be taken care of during implementation. All that is needed may be 
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enough support to tip the decisionmaking body in favor of the proposal. This support 
can be verbal; implementation demands the organization contribute real resources. 
The type of guidance for decwion that can be given as a result of a systems 
analysis may be in the form of clearly specified recornmcndations, e-g., in favor of a 
given decision alternative. Whether this is satisfactory depends on many issues, for ex- 
ample, 
Have the criteria for the recommendations been thoroughly explored and 
agreed? 
Are these criteria expressible in a quantifiable manner? 
Has this quantification been based on value judgments which have been 
agr e d  ? 
Are the models used funy satisfactory and agreed? 
Are the situations tested by the models, and the alternative options ex- 
plored in these situation& reasonably complete and unquestionable? 
Are there agreed ways of weighing multiple criteria and multiple objec- 
tives? 
Apprehension is sometimes said to dominate analysis (Keen 1977). Decision- 
makers learn through apprehension rather than comprehension and rely on experience 
rather than on understanding and analytic methcds. 
It is ofkn possible for decisionmakers to agree on the action to be taken, even 
though they disqree on objectives. A policymaker may concur in the decision to accept 
a study recommendation for reasons far different from those the analyst had in mind. 
He may do so, for instar~ce, because by so doing he may forestall stronger actiofr or- be- 
cause he may see how to divert money that will be appropriated to impiement the 
recommendation to other purposes. 
It is not surprising then that, in general, it is mfer and more satisfactory 
la with the merely to provide pros and cons of many options in many situations In dido+ 
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dedsionmakers, there is a wide-ranging exploration and attempt to make less vague 
both the nature of the problem h l f  and the values that the various possible options for 
decision have for the decisionmaker. Mast systems analysts have ways of doing this, 
although there seems to be no general methodology: there are different approaches 
depending on the values held by analysts and decisionmakers and the way in which they 
interact. 
T h e  aim of systems analysis, while it is to improve decisionmaking, is also to 
make the decisionmaker more satisfied that the basis for his decision is adequate and in- 
formed. T h e  study done must provide new insights into the problem area under discus- 
sion, and it must be structured and presented in a way that facilitates his use of the in- 
formation it contains T h e  analysis must be seen to be relevant and its communication 
must be readily understood. T h e  mode of communication, continuous or at intervals, 
orally or in writing, diagrammatic or in words, technical or nontechnical, mathematical 
or nonmathematical, will vary with circumstances, but it must be in terms familiar to the 
decisionmaker. Special cmmunication aids include interactive computer modeling, 
scenario writing, games and game-theoretic processes, films, and even forms of counsel- 
ling. 
T h e  important issue is how decisionmakers interpret the data put before 
them, because mlg same of this will be seen by them as  information relevant to their de- 
cisions6 Their previous experience. their general world view, their reaction to variables 
and constraints that the analyst has cr has not been able to take fully into account, and 
particularly their attitude towards analysis and their prior beliefs, will all afTect how they 
urn what they are offered. Andysts should strive always to understand the total en- 
vironment of decisionmaking so as to provide the maximum of information and the 
minimum of redundant data, although initial redundancies have a habit of being useful 
if the decisionmaker chooses to delay his decision in one way or a n b h ~ r .  
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The fact, mentioned above, that no general methodology exists for the final 
stage of analysis and decision, leaves one important thing still to be said. Any analyst 
who can make explicit, for a s ta td  systems analysis, how the communication process used 
was conceived and what its successes and failures were, will have added something of 
value to the literature on the subject. The trouble is that, because the process depends so 
much on personal values and understanding of values, it is difficult to write anything 
down in a way that can be interpreted and used by others. It is, nevertheless, worth try- 
ing. 
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1. For a more detailed description of the paradigms of decision analysis see 
chapter 1 in Keeney and Raift'a (1976). 
2 For examination of the basic assumptions behind decision analysis and the 
consequential problems in applications, see Tribe 1972 and White and Bowen 1975. 
3. Scorecards can be considered as a well-linked transition from nearly- 
quantitative methods to lexicographic ones. For a theoretical basis of the latter see Roy 
1977. 
t Such negative impacts are costs to the decisionmaker in the sense that they 
prevent successful implementation or otherwise frustrate his decision. 
5. In economic and decision-theoretic literature, risk is sometimes used with a 
different meaning, denoting a nondeterministic situation where the probabilities of vari- 
ous events are known (see Jennergren and Keeney 1979.) 
6. For some of the pitfalls, see Lynn 1980. 
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